Fakhr al-Dīn Al-Razī and Quṭb al-Dīn Al-Razī on the truth conditions of Affirmative Metathetic Judgement

Abstract

According to Fakhr al-Dīn Al-Razī, the existence of a subject in true affirmative metathetic judgment is not necessary and, hence, the rule of farʻiyyah confronts a challenge. By appealing to the difference in truth conditions of affirmative and negative judgments, Quṭb al-Dīn Al-Razī criticizes Farkhr’s view. According to Quṭb, Fakhr‘s argument rests on the doctrine that “The subject in a proposition should have the predicate or its negation”. Quṭb, however, has another doctrine, although he does not mention it explicitly; i.e., “The subject in a proposition should have the predicate or should not have the predicate”. Logically, different consequences result since different doctrines are considered. In this paper, the differences between Fakhr and Quṭb‘s views concerning the truth conditions of affirmative metathetic and some of their consequences are examined.