Facing Hylomorphism with the pairing problem in substance dualism.

Abstract

Explaining individuation and mind-body relation are the two salient challenges for substance dualists. Hylomorphists following Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, like Oderberg, claim that they have met these challenges adequately. In this paper we focus on the first problem. At first we explain Kim’s challenge of pairing for substance dualism. Accordance with this problem, there is no necessary relation between soul and body, so Cartesian dualist can’t explain how a soul relates with a body not another one. After that, with focus on Hylomorphism, we argue that this view faces the same problem. For this, we argue that although form has a necessary relation with matter but because of form and soul are not identical, so this view faces the pairing problem. For doing this, we distinguish between substantial and accidental changes and argue that corruption of form and generation of soul is substantial change. Then we argue that there is no identity between previous form and soul, so hoylomorphism is not in a better position with respect to substance dualism to solve the pairing problem and individuation of soul. Then we argue that there is no identity between previous form and soul, so hoylomorphism is not in a better position with respect to substance dualism to solve the pairing problem and individuation of soul.