Ontology, Methodology, and Their Relationship in Philosophical Naturalism

Abstract

According to the received view of philosophical naturalism, it has two different types which are characterized as two philosophical theses: ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. Following this account of naturalism, one may pose the question: what is the relationship between the two theses of naturalism that has led to philosophers calling both ‘naturalism’? There are four views about this matter: no relationship between two theses, the epistemic priority of ontological naturalism over methodological naturalism, the epistemic priority of methodological naturalism over ontological naturalism, and relationship but no priority. In this paper, we examine these views and try to show that none is satisfactory and adequate. The problem, we believe, comes from the received view of naturalism, and therefore, an alternative view of naturalism may help to solve the problem. In the end, we propose an alternative view of naturalism and try to show that it can dissolve the problem of the relationship between two theses of naturalism.