Investigating Russell's Theory of Causal Lines

Abstract

Theory of causality and causal law for philosophers is something that Russell considers ridiculous because of its specific features, namely necessity and generality, but as with empiricists such as Hume, he generally does not deny causality. To solve the skepticism problem that could to cause scientific obstruction after Hume's critiques of causation, he proposes new theories about the type of relationship between events that he calls "Causal Lines". Russell's purpose of this theory is to propose principles that can help to obtain finite probability for predicting events. Thus, Russell does not claim that the thematic principles that help us to infer uncertain events can lead us to conclusive conclusions, but that they only can lead us to deduce probable results. Therefore, in this paper, Russell's type of inference and its related thematic principles are examined, and in addition to explaining the concept of 'Causal Lines', its relation to the identity of physical objects is discussed. Finally, the objections of Russell's theory, introduced by Wesley Salmon, a proponent of causal process theory, are discussed.