The Phenomenology of Free Will in Transcendent Wisdom

Abstract

The intuition that humans has about free will, has always been a solid backbone against the overwhelming challenges of free will. In Islamic philosophy, this intuition has been represented in the form of presential knowledge and has been considered as an undoubted knowledge. In this paper, we we have discussed the phenomenology of free will by using the principles of transcendent wisdom by analytical proof method, in the sense that we have examined our intuition about free will and identified its epistemic value. The phenomenological analysis of free will has led us to conclude that the intuition of free will is an interconnected set of ten perceptional components. These components are not identical in terms of epistemological validity and are categorized into three different groups. Some of them are highly visible in the form of presential knowledge or propositions that are directly derived from this particular knowledge (inner experience propositions or VIJDANIAT). This group is absolutely epistemologically valid without any condition. The other group is not highly visible in the form of presential knowledge and requires some evidence to be complete and credible. The third group consists of components that have different degrees, each level has a different epistemological validity than the others. In the intuition of free will, components that are not epistemologically credible provide the context in which, with a common intuition, different interpretations of free will can be presented.