Critique of the Distinction between Knowledge and Mental Existence in the Sadra’s Epistemology

Abstract

One of the common interpretations of Sadra's epistemology is a view that, despite adherence to Sadra's existential look in explaining the truth of knowledge, has a meaningful difference in the other issues and results of the discussion, such as the relation between knowledge and mental existence, the determination of the essential known in the acquired knowledge and other similar issues, with Sadra's explicit opinions. The core of these differences is the belief in the separation and existential otherness between knowledge and mental existence, and from the results of this separation, we can point out that mental existence is in the shadow of knowledge, and the existence of knowledge is essential known, and the mental existence is accidental known. However, we will show in this study that the separation for Sadra is merely conventional, and that knowledge and mental existence from his point of view have an existential unity, and contrary to the above interpretation, this is the mental existence which is essential known in the acquired knowledge, and it is in the shadow of external beings, not the existence of knowledge.