The Rorty-Putnam debate: Pragmatism, naturalism and the challenge of normativity

Abstract

Inspired by linguistic and pragmatic turn, Richard Rorty suggests a contextualist interpretation of relation between truth and justification, and refuses any substantive function of such concepts as reality, truth, and justification beyond totally context-bounded justificatory practices . In contrast, in spite of coming to terms with Rorty’s neo-pragmatism , Hilary Putnam believes his naturalistic approach is uncapable to explain the transcendent character of such important concepts as truth and justification. He also questions Rorty’s exclusively sociological attitude toward justification which makes a nonsense of any reform or progress in the transformation of justificatory practices. In this essay, I would try to show that how Putnam’s criticisms, founded on irreducibility of the normative to the natural, leads Rorty to leave his overtly fervent naturalism found in his early work, and persuades him to insist on a vocabulary pluralism.