Thick Moral Concepts and Their Role in Criticism of Reductionism in Ethics

Abstract

Thick moral concepts are moral concepts that are claimed to bear both evaluative and descriptive content, as opposed to thin ones which bear only the former. This paper firstly argues that the descriptive aspect of these concepts cannot be disentangled from their evaluative aspect. So their evaluative aspect cannot be reduced to thin moral concepts. Secondly, thickness is a gradable concept; any thick concept can be made thicker through adding new descriptive content. Along with changes in the descriptive content of the concept, its evaluative content changes as well; a qualitative change that cannot be reduced to thin evaluative concepts, even if they vary in degree. On this basis and through some other considerations it is concluded that moral deliberations in specific cases are not possible through simply applying general principles which are commonly expressed through thin concepts. Rather, each individual is entrusted with the task of deliberation in each particular case on their own.