The problem of unavoidability of Metaphysics in Metametaphysics: in first critique on Marcus Willaschek interpretation

Abstract

We are aiming to show why human beings are accustomed to ask metaphysical questions. However, we will ask this question as a metametaphysical question. We show that a mature metaphysics will never be able to explain ever raising metaphysical questions nor to determine its metaphysical questions unless it extendedly discusses the questionability of metaphysics. To this aim we first set a framework for possible alternative theories about the questionability of metaphysics and then, as a case study, based on Maecus Willaschek interpretation of Kant first critique will show how two-layer critique of Kant has cleverly set forth this framework and gives his own answer. We hope this attempt shows how questionability of metaphysics depends on explaining the origin of metaphysics. This also hinders some misunderstanding of Kant in contemporary philosophers as well as some mistreating with Metaphysics as a worthful enterprise. It is unavoidable at least for Kant and and some famous figures.