evaluation of Van Inwagen's consequence argument Versus moral responsibility

Abstract

Abstract The consequence indirect argument on the strength of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) seeks to establish that causal determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. So on the one hand, it claims that causal determinism will cause human actions arising from past events and the laws of nature and thus we have no alternative possibilities of any sort. On the other hand it insists that human moral responsibility depends on such freedom of choice and action for activity in counterfactual sequence. Thus, from the perspective of Van Inwagen, drawing of a determined world that in which a moral agent can meaningfully be held morally responsible for what he does or does not would be impossible. In this paper, we will explain and evaluate two components of Van Inwagen's claim within the framework of Islamic philosophy and Frankfurtian rule. Keywords: Consequence argument. Van Inwagen. Moral responsibility. Principle of alternative possibilities. Frankfurtian rule.